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1. Introduction
The killing of Cecil the lion (Panthera leo) ignited enduring and increasingly global
discussion about trophy hunting [1]. Yet, policy debate about its benefits and
costs (e.g. [2,3]) focuses only on the hunted species and biodiversity, not the
unique behaviour of hunters. Some contemporary recreational hunters from the
developed world behave curiously, commonly targeting ‘trophies’: individuals
within populations with large body or ornament size, as well as rare and/or ined-
ible species, like carnivores [4]. Although contemporary hunters have been
classified according to implied motivation (i.e. for meat, recreation, trophy
or population control, [5,6]) as well the ‘multiple satisfactions’ they seek while
hunting (affiliation, appreciation, achievement; [7], an evolutionary explanation
of the motivation underlying trophy hunting (and big-game fishing) has never
been pursued. Too costly (difficult, dangerous) a behaviour to be common
among other vertebrate predators, we postulate that trophy hunting is in fact
motivated by the costs hunters accept. We build on empirical and theoretical con-
tributions from evolutionary anthropology to hypothesize that signalling these
costs to others is key to understanding, and perhaps influencing, this otherwise
perplexing activity.
2. Man the show off?
Subsistence hunting among traditional ‘hunter–gatherers’, which also targets
larger-bodied prey, provides a starting point for understanding trophy hunters
from the developed world. Owing to disagreement over the relative importance
of potential benefits men receive from hunting, however, evolutionary explanations
as to why subsistence hunters target large prey attract competing theories and sig-
nificant controversy. Some assert that energetic and nutritional returns to hunters
and individuals they provision best explain why men accept the costs of big-
game hunting (e.g. [8,9]). Others invoke the pressure to share large prey as an expla-
nation for wide distribution of meat (e.g. [10]). But why target prey that will be
mostly consumed by others? An alternative hypothesis, consistent with data
across hunter–gatherer systems, starts by noting that men generally target species
that are not only large-bodied but also—and, importantly—impose high cost
(i.e. high failure risk; [11,12]). The hypothesis considers the carcass not only as
food but also a signal of the costs associated with the hunter’s accomplishment.
The Meriam peoples of Australia provide a flagship illustration of this associ-
ation. There, men, women and children collect green turtles (Chelonia mydas) when
they come ashore to lay eggs. In contrast, only men hunt them at sea. Pursuing tur-
tles in boats, hunters accept significant economic and personal cost, including a
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dive into dangerous waters [13], despite the fact that most of
what they acquire will be consumed by other community mem-
bers [14,15].
Such seemingly irrational behaviour is resolved by costly
signalling theory [16] from which the hypothesis draws. The
theory considers the social status and prestige that accrue to
successful hunters. The Maasai peoples of eastern Africa them-
selves describe lion killing as a manhood ritual that awards
prestige to the hunter who first spears the animal [17]. Why is
status awarded? Simply put, killing large, dangerous, and/or
rare prey is difficult with high failure risks that impose costs
on the hunter. Accordingly, successful hunts signal underlying
qualities to rivals and potential allies. This holds true for suc-
cessful Meriam turtle hunters, who gain social recognition,
get married earlier to higher-quality mates, and have more sur-
viving children [14]. For such behaviour to be maintained, even
the attempted hunt must signal that the hunter can sustain the
handicap of high-cost, low-consumption activity, providing
honest evidence of underlying phenotypic quality [14,15,16].
We propose that an assessment of contemporary trophy
hunting behaviour offers fresh additional evidence for a costly
signalling model to explain any big-game hunting. First, ined-
ible species, like carnivores commonly targeted by trophy
hunters, make nutritional and sharing hypotheses implausible.
Second, evidence for show-off behaviour appears clear. Trophy
hunters commonly pose for photographs with their prey, with
the heads, hides and ornamentation prepared for display [18].
Interestingly, similar costly display occurs in other taxa. For
example, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) likewise pay a cost in
time and effort spent hunting without commensurate food con-
sumption gains; interpretations of related display behaviour
support a social status model (reviewed in [19]). Similarly,
some seabirds like the pigeon guillemot (Cepphus columba)
show off ‘display fish’, sometimes for hours. Often discarding
them, the behaviour is likewise thought to be social, related to
site-ownership display [20]. Third, whereas some might argue
that caloric returns for edible trophy hunted species are high
and associated costs of failure low (owing to advanced killing
technology and foods easily purchased by participants), the
behaviour still imposes costs that guarantee the honesty of the
signal; while rarely costly in terms of danger or difficulty,
hunts for endangered species can be extraordinarily expensive.
Moreover, even the everyday hunter who targets larger individ-
uals within populations pays the opportunity costs of forgoing
income-generating activities as well as sustenance lost by pas-
sing up smaller, abundant prey. We note that the signal can
honestly reflect a hunter’s socio-economic standing (and qual-
ities that underlie it) but not necessarily any remarkable
physical abilities ([21]; figure 1), given the efficient technology
contemporary trophy hunters employ [4].
A signalling model assumes benefits to both signaller
and audience, the latter benefiting from the information they
can then use in their own ways. It is unclear what specific
benefits—other than increased status—might accrue to trophy
hunters. Trophy hunting systems do not lend themselves to test-
ing for patterns associated with reproductive success, as in the
Meriam example above. Hunting associations (e.g. Boone and
Crockett Club, Safari Club International), however, have elabor-
ate scoring systems that award status. We predict that greater
status is bestowed upon those killing larger and/or rarer
(i.e. costly) animals. Similarly, no detailed data exist on the poten-
tial audience, but we suspect hunters would broadcast the signal
to friends and family, colleagues and members of hunting associ-
ations or social media groups (see below). Survey and/or
interview data, commonly collected in the context of wildlife
management or research, may be able to clarify audience compo-
sition. If we accept that trophy hunting simply provides a vehicle
for status-accumulation, such an interpretation is consistent with
those related to the purchase and display of luxury objects
(e.g. expensive automobiles, clothes and jewellery), long pro-
posed to serve as forms of competitive signalling [22]. Finally,
given that women in hunter–gatherer societies overwhelmingly
target small, predictable prey compared with men [12], there are
now seemingly puzzling examples of female trophy hunters,
often prominent media figures and/or professional hunters
sponsored by outdoor companies. We speculate that such




behaviour, counter to expected gender norms (and their evol-
ution), might allow for increased attention in an increasingly
competitive social media and marketing world (below).
3. Costly signalling in a global, commercialized
world
Worldwide social media creates for trophy hunters a vast
audience to which to boast. Signalling the costs of hunting
are no longer restricted to carcass displays in small social
groups. Men can now communicate an ability to absorb trophy
hunting costs not only to their immediate social group but
also—with the help of the Internet—to a global audience.
Media abound with costly signals. For example, although prob-
ably not a representative sample, many hunters post hunting
stories and pictures on online discussion forums, commonly
emphasizing the size of kills [21]. Advertisements for hunting
equipment likewise frequently emphasize a product’s efficacy
in securing large specimens. In these ways and more, contempor-
ary culture reinforces trophy-seeking behaviour that probably
evolved long ago.
4. Policy-relevant research
Although some argue that trophy hunting provides a route
to conservation, others contend that trophy hunting can pose
significant threats to hunted populations. Interacting with
our signalling hypothesis, and of acute conservation concern,
is how trophy hunting of rare species can propagate a feed-
back loop toward extinction. Known as the ‘anthropogenic
Allee effect’, demand and associated costs increase when other-
wise unprofitable rare resources become attractive, thereby
speeding up their decline [23].
We call for more research to evaluate quantitatively the
conditions that influence trophy hunting motivation. If the sig-
nalling hypothesis explains this behaviour, then policies
designed to limit the perceived cost of the activity, dampen
signal efficacy or both should reduce trophy hunting. Indeed,
recent bans by several governments on the importation of
lion remains have probably curtailed demand, despite the
hunts themselves remaining legal. And how might shame
[24] influence motivation? We predict that social media boast-
ing about lion hunting declined following the widespread
shaming after Cecil’s death during perhaps the largest media
coverage ever associated with wildlife [25]. After all, any per-
ceived benefits of signalling are also probably contingent on
associated threats to status, something shaming would erode.
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